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A New Model of Plan Recognition 
~ o b e r t  P. Goldman,  Christopher W. Ge ib  and Chr is topher  A. Miller 
Honeywell Technology Center 
Minneapolis, MN 55418 USA 
{goldman,geib,cmiller)@htc.honeywell.com 
Abstract approximation, the problem of plan recognition was 
then a problem of graph covering. K&A formalized 
We present a new abductive, probabilistic this view of plan recognition in terms of McCarthy's 
theory of plan recognition. This model dif- circumscription. 
fers from previous theories in being centered 
around a model of plan execution: most 
previous methods have been based on plans 
as formal objects or on rules describing the 
recognition process. We show that our new 
model accounts for phenomena omitted from 
most previous plan recognition theories: no- 
tably the cumulative effect of a sequence of 
observations of partially-ordered, interleaved 
plans and the effect of context on plan adop- 
tion. The model also supports inferences 
about the evolution of plan execution in situ- 
ations where another agent intervenes in plan 
execution. This facility provides support for 
using plan recognition to build systems that 
will intelligently assist a user. 
- 
-. 1 Introduction 
In this paper, we present a new theory of plan recogni- 
tion. Our theory, which is abductive and probabilistic, 
differs from previous theories in treating plan execu- 
tion as primary. This new perspective clarifies a num- 
ber of difficult issues in plan recognition, permitting 
solutions to a wider class of plan recognition prob- 
lems and allows plan recognition work to proceed on 
a firmer theoretical footing. 
i 
In 1986, Kautz and Allen (K&A) published an article, 
"Generalized Plan Recognition," (Kautz & Allen 1986) 
that has framed the discussion of plan recognition ever 
since. K&A defined the problem of plan recognition 
as the problem of identifying a minimal set of top- 
level actions sufficient to  explain the set of observed 
actions. Plans were represented in a plan graph, with 
toplevel actions as root nodes and other actions as 
nodes depending from the top-level actions. To a first 
Unlike K&A's, our abductive, probabilistic theory is 
centered around plan ezecution, instead of around plan 
graphs as formal objects. Our new framework clari- 
fies a number of issues that were obscured by previ- 
ous approaches. In particular, our approach handles 
partially-ordered plans; multiple, interleaved plans; 
the effect of context on plan choice and is able to cor- 
rectly treat a system that is both recognizing actions 
of other agents, and acting on its own right. 
Like K&A, we offer only a formal model of the plan 
recognition problem. We do not pretend to provide 
a solution to either the algorithmic or implementa- 
tion problems, only an understanding at the "knowl- 
edge level." We have encoded our plan recognition 
model in a language that has a computational inter- 
pretation, and we have a proof-of-concept interpreter 
that has been used to test all examples given in this 
paper. However, we do not claim that this interpreter 
provides an efficient solution to the plan recognition 
problem. There are many ways our model could be 
implemented; we mention several possibilities in this 
paper. For that matter, we do not believe that there is 
a single best algorithm, appropriate for all plan recog- 
nition domains. 
Our work on plan recognition is motivated by an in- 
terest in procedure-based crisis management, specifi- 
cally in industrial control. We are working on systems 
that will assist human agents executing crisis manage- 
ment procedures. As a result, our model of plan exe- 
cution is hierarchical and procedural, as distinguished 
from models in which there are only primitive actions, 
or models that assume agents are deliberative (e.g., 
game-theoretic models). This application requires us 
to account for phenomena omitted from most previous 
plan recognition theories: notably the cumulative ef- 
fect of a sequence of observations of partially-ordered, 
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interleaved plans; the effect of context on plan adop- 
tion and the effect of interventions in the process of 
plan execution. 
2 Plans 
In this paper, we use simple hierarchical (task decom- 
position) plans, as most plan recognition work does. 
We assume that agents have a plan library that pro- 
vides recipes for achieving goals. We give a sample 
plan library for a hypothetical space station example 
in Figure 1. 
When an agent wishes to achieve a goal like increasing 
available power (increase-power), the plan library 
provides a set of alternate methods that the agent 
can use. increase-power can be achieved either by 
by generating more power (gen-power) or by reduc- 
ing power consumption (lower-power-use). In order 
to lower-power-use, the agent must do three steps: 
open access panel 2 (open-pa), shutoff experiment 
subsystem X1 (shutoff-XI), and shutoff experiment 
subsystem X2 (shutoff-X2). Note that the plan li- 
brary may be viewed as an A N D / O R  tree, with goals 
as OR nodes and methods as A N D  nodes. 
Our space station plan library contains plans for three 
goals: increasing available power (increase-power), 
increasing the oxygen content of the air (raise-02- 
level) and raising the temperature (raise-temp). 
The goals increase-power and raise-02-level each 
have two alternate methods: generate more power 
(gen-power) and reduce power consumption (lower- 
power-use); and generate more 0 2  (gen-02) and 
reduce 0 2  consumption (lower-Oruse), respectively. 
Since there is only one way of raising the temperature, 
there is no need for an actual method node for it. 
Each of the method nodes has a set of children con- 
nected by "and" arcs representing the actions that are 
the steps of the method. In our simple plan library, 
the methods are all composed of primitive actions: 
open access panel 1 (open-pl ) ,  turn on generator B 
(start-gen-B), open-p2, shutoff-XI, shutoff-X2, 
start 0 2  generator (s tar t-02-gen),  open access panel 
3 (open-p3), seal-off science module (seal-sci), check 
temperature (check-temp), and raise thermostat set- 
point (raise-temp-set). In general, however, meth- 
ods may introduce subgoals. For example, in an al- 
ternate library for this domain, gen-Oa might have 
increase-power as a sub-goal in place of the two ac- 
tions open-p l  and start-gen-B. 
open-pl start-gen-B 
Figure 2: A minimal explanation involving only one 
plan. 
Notice that the agent still has some freedom to choose 
the order of his/her actions. 
Actions may be performed for more than one reason. 
For example, open-pl and start-gen-B are used in 
both gen-power and gen-02. 
Finally, notice that there are two different condi- 
tions/events that are tied to the goals. These dashed 
lines represent the fact that these events affect the like- 
lihood that the agent will adopt the respective goal. 
For example if an EVA is to be prepared (EVA-prep), 
then the agent is more likely to adopt increase-power 
as a goal. Likewise, if the agent notices a drop in 0 2  
level (02-drop), then he is likely to choose raise-02- 
level as a goal. 
3 Plan Recognition 
Plan recognition is the process of inferring the goals 
of an agent from observations of an agent's actions. 
Cohen, Perrault and Allen (1981) distinguish between 
two kinds of plan recognition, keyhole and intended 
plan recognition. In keyhole recognition, the recog- 
nizer is simply watching normal actions by the agent. 
In intended recognition, the agent is cooperative; its 
actions are done with the intent that they be under- 
stood. Keyhole recognition is the problem that 
faces us in our applications, and this fact influences 
the structure of our model. 
To the best of our knowledge, Charniak was the first 
to argue that plan recognition was best understood as 
a specific form of the general problem of abduction, 
or reasoning to the best explanation (Charniak & Mc- 
Dermott 1985). 
In many cases, the steps of a method must be done in a K&A's model of plan recognition (Kautz & Allen 1986) 
particular order. Ordering constraints are represented treated the problem as one of computing minimal ex- 
by directed arcs. For example, open-p2 must precede planations, in the form of vertex covers based on the 
shutoff-X1 and shutoff-X2 for lower-power-use. plan graph. For example, in their approach, if one 
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EV,A-prep o2;drop 
, . 
. . 
. . 
check-temp raise-temp-set 
u 
Figure 1: A hierarchical plan library in diagram form. 
observed open-pl  and start-gen-B, the minimal ex- 
planations would be 
(increase-power A gen-power) V 
(raise-02-level A gen-02) 
See Figure 2. If, in addition, one observed check- 
t e m p ,  then the system would have to  postulate two 
toplevel plans in order to explain (cover) all the ob- 
servations, as shown in Figure 3. 
One problem with this work is that it does not take 
into account differences in the a priori likelihood of 
different plans. Charniak and Goldman (C&G) (1993) 
argued that,  since plan recognition involves abduction, 
it could best be done as Bayesian inference. Bayesian 
inference supports the preference for minimal explana- 
- 
-. tions, in the case of hypotheses that are equally likely, 
but also correctly handles explanations of the same 
complexity but different likelihoods. 
Two plan recognition situations that are not handled 
by either K&A or C&G are the problems of influences 
from the state of the world and evidence from failure 
to observe. Clearly, the state of the world will influ- 
ence an agent's decision to pursue plans. We see in our 
Figure 1 that the space station operator's decision to 
- 
pursue increase-power will be affected substantially 
by whether or not an EVA is to be prepared (EVA- 
prep ) .  K&A could not take this into account, because 
they did not treat the relative likelihood of plans. Even 
for C&G, however, it is not simple to take this into ac- 
count, because they defined their probability distribu- 
tions over the plan tree. On the other hand, when we 
view plan recognition from the point of view of agent's 
pursuing plans, it becomes clear how to handle this. 
The problem of evidence from failure to observe is a 
more complex one. Consider what would happen if 
one observed open-p l  and start-gen-B. Assuming 
that they were equally likely a priori, one would con- 
clude that either increase-power (via gen-power) or 
raise-02-level (via gen-02) were equally good expla- 
nations (see Figure 2). However, as time went by and 
one saw other actions, without seeing start-02-gen, 
the final action of gen-02, one would become more 
and more certain that increase-powerlgen-power 
was the right explanation. Systems like those of C&G 
and K&A, are not capable of reasoning like this, be- 
cause they do not consider plan recognition as a prob- 
lem that evolves over time. They cannot represent the 
fact that an action has not been observed yet. They 
can only be silent about whether an action has oc- 
curred - which just means that the system has failed 
to notice the action, not that the action hasn't oc- 
curred - or assert that an action has not and will 
not occur. We will show that our approach handles 
evidence from failure to observe actions. 
Vilain (1990) presented a theory of plan recognition as 
parsing, based on K&A's theory. Vilain does not actu- 
ally propose parsing as a solution to the plan recogni- 
tion problem. Instead, he uses the reduction of limited 
cases of plan recognition to parsing in order to investi- 
gate the complexity of K&A!s theory. The major prob- 
lem with parsing as a model of plan recognition is that 
it does not treat partially-ordered plans or interleaved 
plans well. Indeed, even within a single method, par- 
tial ordering (as in lower-power-use, where shutoff- 
X 1  and shutoff-X2 can be done in any order, as long 
as open-p2 is done first), would cause an explosion in 
grammar size. 
More recently, Wellman and Pynadath (W&P) (1997) 
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open-pl start-gen-B check-temp check-temp 
start-gen-B 
Figure 3: A minimal explanation for a situation that requires two plans 
have proposed a plan recognition method that is both 
probabilistic and based on parsing. Unfortunately, this 
approach suffers from the same limitations on plan in- 
terleaving as Vilain's. W&P propose that probabilistic 
context-sensitive grammars (PCSGs) might overcome 
this problem, but it is difficult to define a probability 
distribution for a PCSG (Pynadath & Wellman 1997). 
Difficulty in defining a probability distribution is also 
a problem for C&G's approach. Overcoming this dif- 
ficulty is one of the emphases of our own work. 
None of the plan recognition systems that we know 
of properly handles actions taken by the recognizing 
agent. How should the recognizing agent, A, rea- 
son about a situation in which it observes another 
agent, B,  taking some actions, A infers a plan that 
it thinks B is pursuing, takes some actions on B's be- 
half, and then sees further actions by B? Judea Pearl 
has provided the general solution for reasoning about 
such situations, with his theory of interventions (Pearl 
1994). We incorporate interventions into our theory 
of plan recognition, to permit recognizing systems to 
work with the agents whose plans they watch. 
Shortcomings in past approaches motivated the work 
described in this paper. Previous plan recognition sys- 
tems have had trouble handling: 
partially-ordered plans and plan interleaving; 
evidence from failure to observe actions; 
contextual influence on plan choice; 
domains in which the recognizer and the recog- 
nized both act. 
In the following section, we will provide a novel model 
of plan recognition that provides solutions to  these 
problems. 
4 Plan execution model 
Our model for plan execution is a simple one. The ex- 
ecuting agent, a t  the start of the episode, chooses a set 
of plans to execute. The set of plans chosen determines 
the set of primitive actions that are pending. As the 
episode proceeds, the agent will repeatedly execute one 
of the pending actions, and generate a new set of pend- 
ing actions from which further actions will be chosen. 
A new set of pending actions will be generated from 
the previous set by removing the action just executed 
and adding newly enabled actions. Actions become 
enabled when their predecessors are completed. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 5. 
The model of plan execution provides a conceptual 
model for the generation of execution traces. In or- 
der to use this model to perform plan recognition, we 
use this model and reason abductively. 
As a way of motivating some of the issues this work 
is designed to confront this section will present some 
brief examples of the kinds of problems our system is 
designed to handle. 
4.1 Partial orderings 
Most encodings of plan recognition raise the prob- 
lem of partial orders. Partial orders arise through 
tasks that have sub-tasks that are only partially or- 
dered. Method lower-power-use provides an ex- 
ample of partially-ordered sub-tasks: once the access 
panel has been opened, the two subsystems can be shut 
down in either order. Partial ordering also arises when 
an agent pursues multiple, independent tasks simulta- 
neously. Of other plan recognition theories we have 
examined, only K&A1s can properly handle partially- 
ordered tasks 
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4.2 O v e r l o a d e d  a c t i o n s  i b  r b . . . [ - b  
Many plan recognition systems do not permit expla- 
... 
nations for an action in which that action is done as 
part of more than one plan. For example, open-pl 
and s ta r t -gen-B might be done as part of both the 
plans for increase-power  and raise-02-level.  
4.3 P e r f o r m i n g  a c t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  o w n  s a k e  Figure 5: A dynamic belief net illustrating the simple 
model of plan execution. 
Many previous plan recognition systems have required 
that their users make hard distinctions between "top- 
level" actions - actions that can be done for their own 
sake - and other actions that are done only in service 
of higher level goals. Our applications show that this 
distinction is artificial and unrealistic. For example, 
operators of control systems, when not otherwise oc- 
cupied, often glance at the current values of process 
variables. We would expect, e.g., check- temp t o  be 
performed occasionally "for its own sake," rather than 
as part of r a i se - t emp.  Our model does not require a 
hard distinction between top-level and other actions. 
4.4 N e g a t i v e  E v i d e n c e  
Previous plan recognition systems have not been able 
properly t o  take into account negative evidence, the 
confirming or disconfirming effect of failing t o  see some 
action. Previous systems didn't take negative evidence 
into account because they didn't treat observations as 
sequences. 
After a more formal exposition of our model we will 
return t o  discuss these examples and the  inference that  
is performed in our model. 
5 Formalizing the model 
In this section of the paper we present a formal repre- 
sentation of the plan execution model we have outlined 
above. As our notation we use Poole's logic of Prob- 
abilistic Horn Abduction (PHA) (Poole 1993b). PHA 
provides logical rules entailing propositions and dis- 
tinguished assumable propositions called hypotheses. 
These rules are in Prolog-like Horn form. An expla- 
nation for a proposition is a set of hypotheses that ,  
taken together with the rules, entail that  proposition. 
Hypotheses have associated prior probabilities, so the 
logic supports a notion of best (most likely) explana- 
tion. Poole shows that PHA can be used t o  describe 
arbitrary belief nets. 
4.5 C o n t e x t  5.1 Plans 
our model allows us to take into account the state Our plan execution model works in concert with a li- 
- 
of the world when considering what goals the agent b r a r ~  of plans that the agent may be executing. The 
-- might be pursuing, As we stated earlier, if the agent library is made UP of tasks. Tasks may be goa[s, meth- 
has seen a drop in o2 level, then raise-02-level is a ods and primitive actions. C a u t i o n :  Please do not 
better explanation of open-pl than increase-power read too much into the terms "goal" and "method." 
is. By these terms we mean nothing more than disjunc- 
tive and conjunctive nodes in the plan graph (respec- 
tively). 
increasT 
5.2 T h e  M o d e l  
In this section we will walk through the explanation 
of observed actions. Working backward from the ob- 
servation, we must explain how the observed action is 
chosen from the set of pending actions. Then we must 
explain how that set of actions is assembled. The  ex- 
planation of the pending set covers the choice of sub- 
tasks as means t o  achieving higher level goals. I t  also 
covers the evolution of a plan execution episode over 
time. 
Figure 4: Explaining interleaved plans. Recall the discussion in the previous section - in or- 
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der t o  take into account the fact that our agents may 
be carrying out multiple, interleaved, partially-ordered 
plans, we simply stipulate that the action happening 
a t  any t,ime is one that is chosen from the set of pend- 
ing actions. This action of choosing from the current 
pending set corresponds t o  the hollow arrows in Fig- 
ure 5 .  We will define the pending set later. 
(1) happen(X , T + 1)  t 
pending(P ,  T )  , 
X E P ,  
f p i c k ( X ,  P ,  T + 1 ) .  
Rule 1 states that action X happens a t  time T + 1 if 
X is in the set of pending actions and is picked from 
that  set, p i c k ( X ,  P ,  T )  is one of the distinguished 
hypothesis propositions with an associated probabil- 
ity. (In our presentation of the rules, we will mark 
hypotheses with a t.) 
In our current system, we simply assume that  all of 
the pending actions are equally likely. I t  would be 
simple to provide a more complex model of the choice 
of next action t o  execute, for example, some sort of 
exponentially-increasing probability as the action con- 
tinues to be pending. 
For example, two of the explanations for 
happen(open-p l ,  I), from the plan database shown 
in Figure 1 are: (1) The pending set is {open- 
p l ,  check- temp}  and o p e n - p l  is picked; (2) The  
pending set is { open-pl, open-pa}  and open-pl is 
picked. 
We define the  pending set recursively, first providing a 
basis case, that allows us to explain the contents of the 
pending set a t  time zero. The process of choosing the 
initial pending set from the plan library is shown in 
Figure 5 through the narrow arrows. The pending set 
is selected from the set of primitive actions (leaves): 
(2) pending(L,  0) t 
l e a v e s  (Ls )  , 
s e l e c t l e a v e s ( L s ,  L ) )  . 
The  rule for s e l e c t l e a v e s  selects those leaves that 
are enabled 
The  core of our model of plan execution is what it 
means for an action to be enabled. There are two 
reasons why an action may be enabled: either it is 
done for its own sake, or i t  is done as part of a parent 
plan. 
(3) enab led(A,  T )  +for-ounsake(A,  TI. 
(5) fo r_ownsake(A,  T )  t 
i n t e n d a b l e ( A )  , 
t i n t e n d e d ( A ,  T ) .  
The  action A must be one of the set of actions that 
may be done for their own sake. Whether or not a 
particular action meets this condition is indicated in 
the plan database. Note that there are no constraints 
on what kind of action may be done for its own sake; 
goals, methods and primitive actions are all eligible. In 
addition t o  i t  being possible that an action be done for 
its own sake, i t  must actually be done for its own sake. 
This is the second condition, that A be intended,  one 
of the hypotheses whose probability must be assessed 
(this will be discussed later). 
The  other reason why an action might be enabled is 
that it is being done as part of a larger plan: 
(6) fo r -pa ren t (A,  T )  t 
p a r e n t s ( A ,  P s ) ,  
3P E Ps I enabledAy ( A ,  P, T )  . 
There are two ways a child action, C, can be enabled 
as part of a parent plan, P (rules 7 and 10). First, the 
parent plan may be a method; a recipe that is a set of 
steps. In this case, in order for a particular action t o  
be enabled, i t  must be a member of that set of steps, 
and all the preceding steps in that recipe must already 
have been done: 
(7) enabled_by(C,  P, T )  + 
a n d n o d e  ( P  ) , 
e n a b l e d ( P ,  T )  , 
preds (C,  P )  = P , 
V p  E P [ p r e v d o n e ( p ,  T )  1 .  
The  set of predecessors of a given node in a plan is de- 
fined in the plan library. For example, in Figure 1 ,  the 
predecessor set of s t a r t -02-gen  in gen-02 is {start- 
gen-B } .  
The definition for p r e v d o n e  for primitive actions is 
straightforward - a primitive action, A is p r e v d o n e  
a t  T iff happen(A,T1) and T' 5 T .  For composite 
actions, i t  is more complex. Rule 8 gives the condition 
for methods and 9 for goals. 
(8) p r e v d o n e ( A ,  T + 1 )  t 
p r e v d o n e ( A ,  T + 1 )  t 
o r n o d e ( A )  , 
enabled(A , T + 1 ) , 
tchoose_expansion(M, A ) ,  
-. fo r_ownsake(A,  T) ,  
f or-parent  (A,  T )  . The second way a child, C can be enabled as part of a 
plan, P is if C is one of a set of methods for carrying 
The simple case is an action being done for its own out P. In this case, what is required is that the exe- 
case: cuting agent choose C as the way she intends t o  do P: 
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(10) enabled-by(C,  P, T )  t 
o r n o d e ( P )  , 
choose-expansion(C, P )  , 
e n a b l e d ( P ,  T )  . 
Expressions of the form choose-expansion ( C ,  P )  
are hypotheses. In the examples we have worked, we 
have assumed that all of the methods for a given par- 
ent, P ,  are equally likely, however this may easily be 
changed. One need only supply choice probabilities. 
A more substantial limitation is that this approach 
assumes that  only a single method will be chosen by 
the executing agent as his means of achieving P. This 
assumption could be relaxed, but only a t  the cost of a 
more cumbersome model of method choice. So far, we 
have not found this necessary. 
So far, we have provided only the rules necessary for 
explaining the initial contents of the set of pending 
actions and hence, explaining the first action an agent 
takes. As a plan execution progresses, the contents of 
the pending set changes (this process is shown in the 
shaded arrows in Figure 5): 
(11) p e n d i n g ( P t + ~ ,  T +  1)  t 
pending(Pt ,  T )  , 
l e a v e s  ( L s )  , 
p r o g r e s s ( L s ,  Pi, P t+ l ,  T + 1 ) .  
The  p r o g r e s s  rule assembles a new pending list, Pt+' 
by considering the set of primitive actions, adding and 
subtracting appropriate actions. This is the most com- 
plex of the rules, involving several cases: 
1. The most recent action is removed from the pend- 
ing set; 
2. All other previously pending actions remain pend- 
ing; 
3. Things that were not previously pending may be 
added. 
The  need for the rules to be mutually-exclusive and 
exhaustive makes the actual rules for progress some- 
what cumbersome, so we have omitted them from the 
short version of this paper. The interesting case is the 
case of adding a primitive action to the pending set, 
Case 3. Primitive actions are added to the pending 
- set if they have not already been done and if they are 
enabled: 
(12) addme(.-l, T )  t 
7 p r e v d o n e ( A ,  T )  , 
enab led(A,  T )  . 
Recall the two ways an action can become enabled: if 
i t  is the chosen method for a newly-enabled parent (10) 
o r  when is part of a method that is being executed and 
the last of its predecessors has just been completed (7). 
Also, recall that  the definitions of enabled are recur- 
sive, applying not only to primitive actions, but also 
t o  methods and goals. 
5.3 I n c o r p o r a t i n g  C o n t e x t  
So far, we have simply assumed that all plans have 
some fixed a priori probability of being chosen. We 
extend our model of plan execution to make plan adop- 
tion conditional on facts that obtain a t  the start  of 
the episode. We add rules that make plan adoption 
conditional on some facts about the environment. We 
provide an example of this later in the paper. 
5.4 I n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  t h e  E x e c u t i n g  A g e n t  
We wish to perform plan recognition in order to pro- 
vide help to users. To do  this properly, i t  is not enough 
to passively observe the process of plan execution. We 
must also be  able to intervene into the process and 
predict the effects of our interventions. We would like 
t o  build intelligent systems that intervene by perform- 
ing actions on the user's behalf. 
Pearl (1994) provides a theoretical framework for 
causal interventions into processes described by dy- 
namic Bayesian Networks like ours (Figure 5) .  The 
essence of his approach is that one can intervene by 
"clamping" a node in the network and cutting the 
causal links into that node. 
Now we revise the model of plan execution so that 
we permit two explanations for an action occurring: 
either the observed agent carries out the action, or 
the system intervenes to perform an action. We apply 
Pearl's approach t o  our plan execution model by re- 
placing rule (1) above with the following two rules: 
(13) happen(X, T + 1) t i n t e r v e n e ( X , T +  1 ) .  
and the following revision of the original rule ( I ) ,  to 
make i t  mutually exclusive and exhaustive with (13):' 
(14) happen(X,  T + l )  t 
1 i n t e r v e n e ( T  + 1)  , 
pending(L,  T ) ,  
member(X, L ) ,  
p i c k ( X ,  L ,  T + l ) .  
Rule (13) indicates that an intervention makes the oc- 
currance of action A' a t  T+ 1 independent of preceding 
events and the contents of the pending set. However, 
interventions do have causal effects on the future con- 
tents of the pending set and hence on what later ac- 
tions are performed by the agent. 
'PHA requires all rules be mutually-exclusive and 
exhaustive. 
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5.5 Probabil i t ies  6.1 Interleaving plans for mult iple  goals 
In order to make the model here a probabilistic model, Consider the case where the agent executes action 
we need only specify probabilities for a restricted set open-pl  and then action check-temp. Given this, 
of hypotheses. These are as follows: the system can conclude that the agent must be pur- 
suing raise-temp and one or both of increase-power 
1. The probability that the agent will adopt a par- 
ticular task for its own sake. These probabilities 
may either be simple, unconditional probabilities, 
or may be conditional on the agent's environment. 
2. The  roba ability that the agent will choose a par- 
ticular method when attempting to achieve a goal. 
3. The probability that the agent will choose a par- 
ticular primitive action from a set of pending 
primitive actions. 
and raise-02-level: 
The system's beliefs about the multiple goals of the 
agent allow it to assign higher probability to actions 
that contribute to the agent's possible plans. For ex- 
ample, start-gen-B and raise-temp-set are the next 
steps in the respective plans. Therefore,the system be- 
lieves one of these actions will almost certainly be the 
the next action executed: 
These three parameters correspond to the three types P ( ~ t a r t - ~ e n - B ~ l w )  = .4748 
of hypotheses, marked with a t in the rules above P(raise-temp-set31w) = .4748 
above. 
The simple set of rules above, together with a plan li- 
brary, provides a framework for abductive plan recog- 
nition. We may generate abductive proofs for the oc- 
currence of observed action sequences, and from these 
explanations extract user intentions. In the following 
section, we provide several worked examples. These 
serve both to illustrate our model and to show how it 
differs from previous work in this area. 
6 Plan recognition examples 
6.2 Part ial ly ordered  p lans  
The pending set provides our system the ability to han- 
dle partially ordered plans. Consider the case of ac- 
tions open-p2, shutoff-X1 and shutoff-X2! which 
make up lower-power-use. In this domain, action 
open-p2 is the only predecessor for both shutoff-X1 
and shutoff-X2. Thus once open-p2 has been exe- 
cuted both shutoff-Xl and shutoff-X2 are enabled 
and therefore are in the pending set until they are per- 
formed. 
In this section we provide examples that show how our The rules for construction of the pending set guarantee 
model handles difficult plan recognition cases. In these that ordering constraints are enforced. For example, 
examples, unless we state otherwise, we have assumed action start-gen-B cannot be added to the pending 
that all goals are equally likely and all methods are set until action open-PI has been performed (see Fig- 
equally likely to be chosen by the agent. Most of these ure 1). 
examples will be based on the plan library shown in 
Figure 1. We stress that these assumptions are not 
parts of our model - they are additional simplifica- 
tions for the sake of clarity in presentation. 
We abbreviate propositions like happen(open-pl,  
t) as open-pit, yielding expressions like P(open- 
p l l ) :  the probability that open-pl  happens at  time 
1, and P(check-tempzlopen-pll): the probabil- 
ity that check-temp happens at  time 2 given that 
open-pl  happened at  time 1. Likewise, we will 
use P(intend(increase-power) lopen-pl to express 
the system's posterior belief that the agent intends 
to increase-power given that open-p l  happened 
at time 1. Where it is possible without ambiguity, 
we will use w to represent the observations, as in 
P(intend(increase-power) lw). 
6.3 Overloaded act ions 
In Figure 1, open-p l  is an example of an action that 
may be done as part of two plans, simultaneously. This 
possibility can be readily handled by our theory. Re- 
call that in order to explain observations, we must find 
each pending set consistent with the evidence and con- 
sider its possible explanations. If we ask for the proba- 
bility that open-p l  will be the first action performed, 
we must consider all of t.he possible goal sets the agent 
might be pursuing and all the possible expansions of 
those goals. As part of this process, we will find ex- 
planations where action open-p l  is used as part of 
two different methods: one for increase-power and 
another to raise-02-level. 
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6.4 P e r f o r m i n e  a c t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  o w n  s a k e  P q 
Let us compare two cases in which we observe check- 
t e m p .  In the first case, we make the conventional 
assumption that check- temp will only be done as 
part of a plan t o  raising the temperature. In this 
case, we can prove that  the agent must be execut- 
ing ra ise- temp.  If, on the  other hand, we consider 
the possibility that  the operator is idly checking the 
temperature, then we will conclude that the proba- 
bilities that the agent is pursuing ra i se - t emp or just 
doing check- temp,  is equal t o  their prior probabili- 
ties. If the probability of doing check- temp "for its 
own sake" is relatively high, then we will not neces- 
sarily conclude that the  agent is trying to raising the 
temperature. If this plan recognition is being done as 
part of a system that might take actions to help the 
agent it is observing, one can see that getting this right 
is important. 
6.5 Nega t ive  E v i d e n c e  
Consider what happens if we were t o  see actions open- 
p l  and start-gen-B. All else being equal, we can 
conclude that increase-power (by means of gen-  
power )  and raise-02-level (via gen-02) are equally 
likely. But now consider what happens as we see ac- 
tion check- temp,  and then action raise-temp-set.  
As time goes by and we see other actions, we become 
more and more confident that we have seen method 
gen-power  and not simply the beginning of gen-02.  
The  use of the pending set in our framework provides 
a simple and elegant solution t o  this problem. Recall 
that  an action happens if i t  is in the set of pending ac- 
tions, and is picked from that  set. In our framework, as 
we see the sequence of actions that does not contain 
- 
-. 
s tar t -02-gen grow, we will gradually become more 
and more certain that  s tar t -02-gen is not a member 
of the pending set. This will undermine our previ- 
a b c  a d e  
w -
Figure 6: A plan library with two equally likely meth- 
ods. 
lationship between EVA-prep  and increase-power  
is deterministic (this is not required by our formal- 
ism): if EVA-prep  is true then the agent intends 
increase-power  and if 7 E V A - p r e p  then the agent 
will not intend increase-power .  If P (EVA-prep)  = 
0.5 then all three plans are equally likely a pri- 
o r ~ :  P(increase-power) = P(raise-02-level) = 
P(raise- temp) = 0.5 
The  probabilities of the initial actions for increase- 
p o w e r  are P ( o p e n - p l l )  = .2864 and P ( o p e n -  
p2 , )  = .1458. However, if the system knows that 
EVA-prep  is true, then its belief that the agent is pur- 
suing increase-power  shifts up  t o  one and the p r o b  
ability of any action that contributes t o  this plan in- 
creases. Thus P(open-p l l lEVA-prep)  = ,3854 and 
P ( o p e n - p 2 l  [EVA-prep)  = .2916. 
6.7 I n t e r v e n t i o n s  
Consider the set of actions given in Figure 6. S u p  
pose the agent is observed performing action a .  The 
only plans that are consistent with performing a are 
p and q and these are equally likely. Therefore, 
the system concludes that the agent is doing either 
p or q with equal probability: P(intend(p)lal)  = 
P(intend(q)lal)  = .6666. It  further concludes that 
the actions b and d are equally likely to appear next: 
P(b2lal)  = P(d2lal)  = .5 .  
. . . . . ,  
ous belief in hypothesis raise-02-level and reinforce Suppose the agent were to perform b. Since p is the 
our belief in increase-power.  Table 1 shows how the 
only reason to do  b, the system can safely infer that 
conditional probabilities for this problem evolve over 
, . the agent intends D. This also tends to e x ~ l a i n  awav tlme. 
6.6 C o n t e x t  
- Our model allows us t o  take into account the state of 
the world when considering what goals the agent might 
be pursuing. This capability is essential in supporting 
users whose tasks are influenced by the state of the 
world, e.g. users that are controlling a manufacturing 
plant. 
Figure 1 shows that the agent's intentions toward 
increase-power  depend on the proposition EVA- 
p r e p .  We assume for simplicity's sake that the re- 
" 
a, lowering the probability of q: P(intend(q)lal ,bz) = 
,3333. The execution of b also enables c and provides 
evidence that it will be next: P(cslal,b2) = .8333. 
Now consider what would happen if, rather than the 
agent performing b, the system had done i t  for her (we 
write this as I (b2) .  The  plan recognition algorithm's 
only treats b as evidence for the agent's pursuit of p 
if the agent herself does it. If the system performs 
b ,  then the system's belief in the  probability of the 
agent pursuing p does not change: P(intend(p)lal)  = 
P(intend(p) la l ,  I(b2)) = ,6666 
However, the execution of b by the system does licence 
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Table 1: Results showing the cumulative impact of negative evidence. 
Time 
2 
3 
4 
some inferences. For example, since b has been exe- Acknowledgements Thanks to David Poole for his 
cuted c is now enabled, and therefore will be added PHA interpreter and help working with it. 
to the pending set. Since the system's execution of b 
does not change the system's beliefs about the goals References 
- - 
the agent is persuing, the system believes that c is as 
likely to be the next action as b was before its execu- Charniak, E., and Goldman, R. P. 1993. A Bayesian 
tion: P(bzlal)  = P(c31al, I (bz))  = .5. model of plan recognition. Artificial Intelligence 64(1):53-79. 
Proposition 
P(intend(increase-power) lopen-pll,start-gen-B2) 
P(intend(raise-02-level)~open-pll,start-gen-B2) 
P(intend(increase-power) lopen-pll,start-gen-B2,check-temp3) 
P(intend(raise-02-level) lopen-pll,start-gen-B2,check-temp3) 
P(intend(increase-power)~open-pl~,start-gen-B~,check-temp3,raisetemp-set4) 
P(intend(raise-02-level)~open-pll,start-gen-Bz,check-temp3,raise-temp-set4) 
7 Implementation 
Probability 
,6414 
,6414 
,7416 
,4832 
3282 
,3128 
Our plan recognition theory has been implemented 
computationally. The implementation centers around 
a PHA abductive theorem prover. Our theorem-prover 
is based on David Poole's (Poole 1993a) but, it differs 
substantially in search strategy. All examples men- 
tioned in this paper have been tested and work in our 
implementation. 
The rules used by the program differ from those pre- 
sented earlier only in the treatment of quantification 
and negation, neither of which are interpreted by the 
theorem prover. We expect to make our theorem 
prover and rule set publicly available. 
8 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have presented a general model 
of plan recognition based on probabilistic abductive 
logic. The centerpiece of the model is a simple formal 
theory of plan execution. In comparison with previous 
work on plan recognition, our theory better handles se- 
quences of actions generated by interleaved, partially- 
ordered plans. Our theory can accommodate infor- 
mation about the context in which plans are adopted. 
Finally, unlike previous theories, ours can incorporate 
interventions into the process of plan execution. 
In future work, we would like to address some of the 
limitationsof our model. One limitation is that in this 
model the agent does not interact with its surround- 
ings. The actions done by the agent and the interven- 
tions do not change the world state, because the world 
state is not represented. We are now working on a 
more elaborate plan execution model that takes this 
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